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DAMAGE TOLERANCE ASSESSMENTS OF COMMERCIAL JET 
TRANSPORT STRUCTURES 
SUMMARY 
Design of safe and competitive commercial aircraft structures involves a host of 
significant considerations. Some accidents were milestones along the road. New 
concepts has been proposed related to structural design, materials, production 
techniques, inspection procedures and load spectra. The present state of the art has 
been affected by various conditions associated with interests of the aircraft industry, 
the aircraft operator and the airworthiness authorities. The current trends in aircraft 
operations are showing an increasing demand for lower operational and maintenance 
costs. Practically, this translates into aircraft with longer design lives with longer 
inspection intervals and shorter inspection downtimes and fleets that are operated 
beyond intended design life. As a consequence, the damage tolerance aspects of 
primary aircraft structures are becoming highly important, due to the tighter design 
requirements for new aircraft on the design table. Damage tolerance assessment and 
design play a major role in the aerospace industry not only in the design of new 
structures and components but also their ongoing maintenance and support.   
This study is focused on general overview and literature review of damage tolerance 
assessments and design philosophy,  better understanding of design principles (static, 
safe life, fail safe and damage tolerance), current airworthiness regulations for 
damage tolerance evaluation of structures, continued airworthiness challenges in  the 
industry; corrosion prevention and control programs, widespread fatigue, repair 
assessment process and guidelines and supplemental inspection programs. 
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TİCARİ JET UÇAK YAPILARININ HASAR TOLERANS 
DEĞERLENDİRMELERİ 
ÖZET 
Güvenli ve rekabetçi ticari uçak yapıları tasarımı, pek çok önemli faktörü içerir. 
Kimi kazalar, yol boyunca kilometre taşları (dönüm noktası) olmuştur. Yapısal 
tasarım, malzeme, üretim teknikleri, kontrol prosedürleri ve yük spektralarına ilişkin 
olarak yeni kavramlar önerilmektedir. Günümüzdeki gelişme seviyesi, uçak 
sanayiinin çıkarlarına, uçak operatörüne ve uçuşaelverişlilik otoritelerine bağlı çeşitli 
durumlardan etkilenmiştir. Uçak operasyonlarındaki şimdiki eğilimler, daha düşük 
işletme ve bakım masraflarına yönelik artan bir talebi gösteriyor. Pratikte bu; daha 
uzun tasarım ömürleri, daha uzun kontol aralıkları ve daha kısa kontol arıza süresi 
olan uçaklar anlamına gelir. Bunun bir sonucu olarak da, birincil uçak yapılarının 
hasar tolerans analizleri/değerlendirmeleri, tasarım masasında yeni uçaklar için daha 
sıkı gereksinimler olması nedeniyle, çok önem kazanmaktadır. Hasar tolerans 
değerlendirmesi ve hasar tolerans tasarımı, hava-uzay sanayiinde, yalnızca yeni 
yapılar ve parçaların tasarımı açısından değil, onların süregelen bakımı ve desteği 
açısından da bellibaşlı bir rol oynar. 
Bu çalışma, hasar tolerans değerlendirmeleri ve tasarım felsefesine hem üretici hem 
de operatör açısından genel bir değerlendirme üzerinde odaklanmıştır. Havacılık 
endüstrisinde dönüm noktası sayılan kazarlardan öğrenilen dersler, günümüz 
havacılık sanayiinde kullanılmakta olan tasarım ilkeleri (statik, güvenli ömür, arıza 
emniyeti ve hasar toleransı), yapıların hasar tolerans değerlendirmesi için varolan 
uçuşaelverişlilik mevzuatı, yaşlanan uçak meselesi, yaygın yorgunluk hasarı, 
sanayideki süregelen uçuşa elverişlilik sorunları, korozyon önlenme ve kontrolü, 
onarımların/tamirlerin değerlendirme teknikleri, değerlendirme süreci ve ana 
esaslarının daha iyi anlaşılmasını amaçlar. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Operations economy demands that structures can be operated safely throughout the 
expected service life. Design of structures is fundamentally a guided interactive 
process aimed at achieving a practical balance between state-of-the-art structural 
capability and the intended usage requirements. These capabilities and requirements 
are typically evaluated against each other through a disciplined design process 
comprising regulations, methods and analysis, data bases, validation tests etc.  
Modern airplanes operate in a complex combination of external load sources, 
environments, human elements and economic requirements. The structure must be 
designed so that it can satisfy, with a sufficient confidence level, the requirements of 
the service life. Also, today’s economic reality dictates that a fleet must be operated 
beyond intended design life. The estimated material properties must be evaluated as 
precisely as possible within all the environmental conditions to avoid failures. For 
this reason the aircraft structural integrity programs are put in place to provide an 
integrated and systematic approach to aircraft structural engineering and 
maintenance. Following chapters are focused on examples of lessons learned from 
commercial jet transport accidents, historical perspective and details of design 
philosophies, general overview of damage tolerant design principle and its elements 
and continued airworthiness challenges in the industry from a damage tolerance point 
of view.  
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2.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACCIDENTS 
Many of the lessons learned from tragedies are timeless, and are relevant to today's 
aviation community. By learning from the past, aviation professionals can use that 
knowledge to recognize key factors, and potentially prevent another accident from 
occurring under similar circumstances, or for similar reasons, in the future.  
2.1 BOAC Flight 781, de Havilland DH-106 Comet 1, G-ALYP and  South 
African Airways (SAA) Flight 201, de Havilland DH-106 Comet 1, G-ALYY 
The de Havilland Comet was the world's first commercial jet airliner to reach 
production. Developed and manufactured by de Havilland, The design was of the 
Comet aircraft commenced in September, 1946 it first flew on July 27, 1949 and was 
considered a landmark in British aeronautical design. The first production aircraft 
(G-ALYP) flew on January 9, 1951 and it was granted on March 22, 1952.  The 
aircraft was delivered to B.O.A.C. on March 13, 1952 and entered into scheduled 
passenger service on May 2, 1952, after having accumulated 339 hours. The aircraft's 
performance was much superior to that of contemporary propeller-driven transports. 
Apart from its speed, the Comet was the first high-altitude passenger aircraft, with a 
cabin pressure differential almost double that of its contemporaries [1]. 
Within two years after service, on January 10, 1954, a Comet I aircraft (DH 106-1) 
serial number G-ALYP known as Yoke Peter disintegrated in the air at 
approximately 30,000 feet and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea off Elba. The 
aircraft was on a flight from Rome to London. At the time of the crash the aircraft 
had flown 3680 hours and experienced 1286 pressurized flights. The Comets were 
removed from service on January 11, 1954. A number of modifications were made to 
the fleet to rectify some of the items which were thought to have caused the accident 
and service was resumed on March 23, 1954.On April 8, 1954, only sixteen days 
after the resumption of service, another Comet aircraft  G-ALYY known as Yoke 
Yoke disintegrated in the air at 35,000 feet and crashed into the ocean near Naples. 
The aircraft was on a flight from Rome to Cairo. At the time of the crash the aircraft 
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had flown 2703 hours and experienced 903 pressurized flights. Prior to these two 
accidents, on May 2, 1953, another Comet, G-ALYV had crashed in a tropical storm 
of exceptional severity near Calcutta. An inquiry, directed by the Central 
Government of India, determined that this accident was caused by structural failure 
which resulted from either: 
a) Severe gusts encountered during a thunderstorm. 
b) Overcontrolling or loss of control by the pilot when flying through a    
thunderstorm. 
After the Naples crash on April 8, 1954, B.O.AC. immediately suspended all 
services. On April 12, 1954, the Chairman of the Airworthiness Review Board 
withdrew the certificate of airworthiness. The UK Minister of Supply instructed Sir 
Arnold Hall, Director of the Royal Aeronautical Establishment, to complete an 
investigation into the cause of the accidents. On April 18, 1954, Sir Arnold decided 
that a repeated loading test of the pressure cabin was needed. It was decided to 
conduct the test in a tank under water. In June 1954, the test started on aircraft G-
ALYU, known as Yoke Uncle. The aircraft had accumulated 1230 pressurized flights 
prior to the test. After 1830 further pressurizations, for a total of 3060, the pressure 
cabin failed. The starting point of the failure was at the comer of a passenger 
window. The cabin cyclic pressure was 8.25 psi but a proof cycle of 1.33P was 
applied at approximately 1,000 pressure cycle intervals. It was during the application 
of one of these cycles that the cabin failed. Examination of the failure provided 
evidence of fatigue. Further investigation of Yoke Peter on structure recovered near 
Elba also confirmed that the primary cause of the failure was pressure cabin failure 
due to fatigue. The origin in this case was at the corner of the Automatic Direction 
Finding (ADF) windows on the top centerline of the cabin. Yoke Uncle was repaired 
and the fuselage skin was strain gauged near the window corners. The peak stresses 
measured were 43,100 psi for 8.25 psi cabin pressure plus 650 psi for Ig flight and 
1950 psi for a 10 ft/sec gust for a total of 45,700 psi. The material was DTD 546 
having an ultimate strength of 65,000 psi. Therefore, the IP + Ig stress was 70% of 
the material ultimate strength. Thus, the cause of the failures was determined to be 
fatigue due to high stresses at the window comers in the pressure cabin. This 
investigation resulted in considerable attention to detail design in all future pressure 
cabins and demonstrated the need for full-scale fuselage fatigue tests [2, 3]. 
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Swift [1], described the Comet pressure cabin structure in more detail, in order to 
bring out some further important aspects of the service failures. Figure 2.1 shows the 
basic pressure shell structure and the probable failure origin for Comet G-ALYP. The 
basic shell structure had no crack-stopper straps to provide continuity of the frame 
outer flanges across the stringer cutouts. The cutouts, one of which is shown in figure 
2.2b, created a very high stress concentration at the first fastener. In the case of the 
probable failure origin for Comet G-ALYP the first fastener was a countersunk bolt, 
as shown in figure 2.2c. The countersink created a knife-edge in both the skin and 
outside doubler. The early fatigue failure may thus be attributed to high local 
stresses, Figure 2.1, combined with the stress concentrations provided by the frame 
cutout and knife-edge condition of the first fastener hole, Figures 2.2b and 2.2c. 
Once the fatigue crack initiated in Comet G-ALYP, its growth went undetected until 
catastrophic failure of the pressure cabin. Obviously this should not have happened, 
but Swift [1] provided an explanation from subsequent knowledge. He showed that 
the basic shell structure of the Comet could have sustained large, and easily 
detectable, one- and two-bay cracks if they had grown along a line midway between 
the positions of the frame cutouts. In other words, the basic shell structure would 
have had adequate residual strength for these crack configurations. However, neither 
one- nor two-bay cracks would be tolerable if they grew along the line between 
frame cutouts. For these cases crack-stopper straps would have been needed to 
provide adequate residual strength. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Probable Failure Origion of Comet G-ALYP 
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Figure 2.2: Details of the Probable Failure Origin of Comet G-ALYP  
2.1.1. Lesson learned  
In Comet accident, the fatigue properties of the production airplanes were not well 
understood, and test results were misleading regarding the airplane's actual fatigue 
life. The performance of test specimens must be representative of the production 
airplane, and produce results that are conservative relative to the expected usage and 
environment. De Havilland's fatigue test setup did not reflect the production fleet. 
The test specimen had been previously cold worked due to overloaded proof pressure 
testing. This overload inadvertently enhanced the fatigue life of the specimen, and 
thus produced results which did not reflect the production configuration. Following 
the  accidents, it was learned that the original test fuselage had been subjected to both 
the overpressure tests and subsequently, to the fatigue cycle testing. These two tests 
conducted on the same test article inadvertently changed the material properties in 
high stress areas of the fuselage (i.e., window corners). Production airplanes, which 
had not been subjected to repeated overpressure cycling, were found to form fatigue 
cracks near the corners of the windows at approximately 1000 airplane flight cycles, 
while the original test specimen was subjected to 16,000 cycles before the first crack 
was observed. Comet era, the fatigue design principles were safe life. This means 
that the entire structure was designed to achieve a satisfactory fatigue life with no 
significant damage, i.e. cracking. The Comet accidents, and other experiences, 
showed that cracks could sometimes occur much earlier than anticipated, owing to 
limitations in the fatigue analyses, and that safety could not be guaranteed on a safe 
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life basis without imposing uneconomically short service lives on major components 
of the structure. These problems were addressed by adoption of the fail safe design 
principles in the late 1950s. [4] 
2.2 Dan-Air Services, Ltd, 707-300, G-BEBP 
On May 14, 1977,  Dan-Air (G-BEBP) on a non-scheduled international cargo flight 
lost the entire right-hand horizontal stabilizer just before it would have landed at 
Lusaka International Airport.  
The aircraft had been manufactured in 1963 and had since accumulated 47,621 
airframe flight hours and 16,723 landings. G-BEBP was the first aircraft off the 707-
300C series convertible passenger/freighter production line [5]. The crash led to the 
striking but unflattering term “geriatric jet”.  
Examination of the detached stabilizer revealed evidence of a fatigue failure of the 
top chord of the rear spar, initiating at the 11th fastener hole, which is used by 
both the rear spar upper chord and upper skin structure. The location of the fastener 
was 14.25 inches outboard of the attachment of the stabilizer attachment pin. The 
cracking progressed in fatigue over approximately 60% of the chord, and then began 
a series of several tensile jumps, separated by small periods of fatigue.  
The total number of flights between the initiation of the fatigue crack and the final 
failure of the upper chord was estimated by the investigators to have been 
approximately 7,200 flights, with 3,500 of the flights being the duration to grow the 
crack across the exposed surface of the top chord. Failure of the top chord was 
followed by fracture of the upper web, center chord, lower web and lower chord, 
leading to loss of the stabilizer and loss of control of the aircraft.  
The investigation discovered no unique feature leading to the cracking at the 11th 
fastener hole other than high stresses existing in the entire inboard area of the rear 
spar. The location of the 11th fastener hole is indicated by an arrow in Figure 2.3 [4]. 
Figure 2.4 shows that the rear spar consisted of discrete elements. These were linked 
together by fasteners. 
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Figure 2.3: Photo of Fracture Face Emanating from the 11th Fastener 
This configuration was intended to be a fail safe design and design should be able to 
sustain significant and easily detectable damage before safety is compromised. The 
key to the Dan Air Boeing 707 crash is "easily detectable". This means that 
sustainable significant damage should be large enough to be found by the specified 
inspection method and there should be adequate time for inspection when the 
damage reaches a size detectable by the specified inspection method.  
 
Figure 2.4: Fatigue Origin of the Dan Air Boeing 707 
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Both these aspects were concerned in the accident. Firstly, periodic inspection of the 
horizontal stabilizer had a recommended time less than half an hour. This suggests 
visual inspection, which - as subsequently demonstrated by post-accident fleet 
inspection -  would not have detected a partial failure of the upper chord of the rear 
spar. Secondly, once the upper chord had failed completely, enabling the damage to 
be detected visually, the structure could not sustain the service loads long enough to 
enable the failure to be detected Thus although the manufacturer had designed the 
horizontal stabilizer to be failsafe, in practice it was not, owing to the inadequacy of 
the inspection method.  
The most immediate lesson from the Dan Air Boeing 707 crash is that a fail safe 
design concept does not by itself constitute a fail safe design. Inspectability is 
equally important, as discussed above. The crash also prompted airworthiness 
authorities to reconsider the fatigue problems of older aircraft. It became clear that 
existing inspection methods and schedules were inadequate, and that supplementary 
inspection programmes were needed to prevent older aircraft from becoming fatigue-
critical [5, 6]. 
2.2.1. Lesson learned 
The horizontal stabilizer of the 707-300 was a "scaled-up" design of the 707-
100/200. The structural characteristics of the two designs were assumed to be 
similar, and extrapolations of assumptions to the new design were considered valid. 
Results from the fatigue tests conducted on the 707-100/200 were used to validate 
the assumptions on the 707-300 design, and new testing was not conducted. The 
accident demonstrated that the basic similarity assumptions were incorrect, and that 
testing to validate those assumptions should have been conducted in order to 
properly understand the changes to structural properties inherent in the new design. 
The Dan-Air accident is considered by many to be the final catalyst for the issuance 
of regulations requiring establishment of damage tolerance based inspections, 
whenever practical, for transport category aircraft. At the time of the accident, there 
were on-going discussions within the aircraft industry regarding the need for an 
alternative to fail-safety for protection against fatigue in older aircraft and for new 
type designs. [4] 
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2.3 Aloha Airlines Flight  243 
On April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737-297 serving the flight suffered extensive damage 
after an explosive decompression during climb out at cruise altitude, but was 
amazingly, able to land safely at Kahului Airport on Maui.  About 18 foot /5.5 m 
long section of the upper fuselage and supporting structure aft of the cabin entrance 
door and above the passenger floorline suddenly departed the aircraft sweeping a 
flight attendant overboard, Figure 2.5. The accident airplane, N73711, a Boeing 737-
297, serial number 20209, was manufactured in 1969 as production line number 152 
and had since accumulated 89,680 flight-cycles and 35,496 flight-hours at the time of 
the accident [7].  
  
Figure 2.5: Illustration Showing the Missing Fuselage Section 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Structural Apects of Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 Accidents 
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Owing to the short distance between destinations on some Aloha Airlines routes, the 
maximum pressurization differential was not reached in every flight. Thus the 
number of equivalent full pressurization cycles was significantly less than 89,680. 
Nevertheless, the aircraft was nearly 19 years old. It was also operating with long-
term access to warm, humid, maritime air. Investigation showed the large loss of 
pressure cabin skin was caused by rapid link-up of many fatigue cracks in the same 
longitudinal skin splice. The fatigue cracks began at the knife-edges of rivet holes 
along the upper rivet row of the splice, see Figure 2.6. This type of failure is called 
Multiple Site Fatigue Damage (MSD). Somewhat poignantly, Swift discussed the 
then potential dangers of MSD less than a year before the accident [1,6]. Major 
contributions to the accident can be summarized as follows [4]: 
Lap Splice (Joint) Design: Adjacent fuselage panels are joined longitudinally by 
overlapping the edge of the skin of the upper panel about three inches over the edge 
of the skin of the lower panel. On the early 737s (up to line number 291), the 
overlapping skins were bonded together with an adhesive and were fastened with 
three rows of rivets. The fuselage pressurization (hoop) loads were intended to be 
transferred through the adhesive bond, rather than through the rivets. This design 
used a cold bond adhesive (a scrim cloth is impregnated with an adhesive that cures 
at room temperature and must be kept at dry ice temperature until shortly before its 
use to prevent premature curing). The cold bond process had manufacturing 
difficulties (surface preparation quality, condensation in the joint during assembly, 
and premature curing of the adhesive). These difficulties led to the random 
appearance of bonds with degraded adhesion, with susceptibility to corrosion, and 
with some areas that did not bond at all. Disbonded areas were then subject to in-
service corrosion due to moisture wicking, which leads to further disbonding. 
Widesprad Fatigue (WFD): Once disbonding of the lap splice occurs, the fuselage 
pressurization loads that were intended to be transferred by the adhesive bond are 
instead transferred by the rivets. Since the countersink for the rivet head went 
through the entire thickness of the upper skin (creating a knife edge), a higher than 
typical stress concentration resulted . The combination of effects from the high stress 
concentration, the rivet load transfer and the far field stress levels led to the 
development of fatigue cracks at many adjacent or neighboring rivet locations 
[Multi-Site Damage (MSD)].  
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An insidious feature of MSD is that many small, hard-to-detect cracks can link up 
rather suddenly to form a long, critical crack. The advanced stages of MSD, which 
occurred on this airplane, can result in Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD), a 
condition where the airplane structure is no longer able to sustain the required 
residual strength loads. 
Maintenance and Surveillance:  The Aloha Airlines maintenance program used a D-
check (heavy maintenance and inspection check) interval of 15,000 flight-hours, 
which appears acceptable compared to the 20,000 flight-hour interval recommended 
by manufacturer. However, due to the unusually short flights in the Aloha Airlines 
flight schedule, flight-cycles were accumulated at about twice the rate that Boeing 
considered when it produced its maintenance recommendations. In pressurized 
fuselage structure, the initiation of fatigue cracks and the subsequent rate of crack 
growth are predominated by the accumulation of flight-cycles, not flight-hours. This 
fact was not sufficiently regarded when the Aloha Airlines maintenance program was 
produced and then approved by the FAA (some maintenance tasks should have been 
more frequent). After the accident, visual inspection of the exterior of the airplanes in 
the Aloha Airlines 737 fleet was conducted. Swelling and bulging of skin, dished 
fastener heads, pulled or popped rivets, and blistering, scaling, and flaking paint were 
present at many sites along the lap joints of almost every airplane. According to the 
NTSB, Aloha Airlines did not produce evidence that it had in place specific severe 
operating environment corrosion detection and control programs as outlined in the 
manufacturer Corrosion Prevention Manual. The NTSB noted that "it appears that 
even when Aloha Airlines personnel observed corrosion in the lap joints and tear 
straps, the significance of the damage and its criticality to lap joint integrity, tear 
strap function, and overall airplane airworthiness was not recognized [7]. It was 
further noted that "the overall condition of the Aloha Airlines fleet indicated that 
pilots and line maintenance personnel came to accept the classic signs of on-going 
corrosion damage as a normal operating condition." 
2.3.1 Lesson learned 
The Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 accident prompted worldwide activities to ensure the 
safety and structural integrity of aging aircraft. Manufacturers, operators and 
airworthiness authorities have collaborated to develop new regulations and advisory 
circulars, or extend existing ones. The FAA joined with NASA in organising several 
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ageing aircraft conferences, and research funding was provided for investigation of 
many aspects of the problem. In all these activities the emphasis has been on 
Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD) in pressure cabins, though the wings and 
empennage are included. However, another major issue is corrosion. Soon after the 
Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 accident, an Airworthiness Assurance Working Group 
(AAWG) was formed to establish a common approach to corrosion control in 
commercial transport aircraft [6]. 
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3. FOUR MAJOR DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
The modern aeronautical engineering of aircraft design has been an evolutionary 
process accelerated tremendously in recent times from the demanding requirements 
for safety and the pressures of competitive economics in structural design. The 
relatively short span during which aircrafts were designed and manufactured 
witnessed four different design and analysis philosophies [8], Figure 3.1: 
 
Figure 3.1: Timeframe for Four Major Design Philosophy 
Static Strength Design (cca 1900-1950) was based on limiting the allowable stresses 
to some “safe” fraction of the static strength and /or fatigue limit. The damage 
attributed to accidental  loads, corrosion and/or fatigue was summarily ignored.  The 
design limits and limits loads inferred directly from test. 
Safe Life Design (cca 1950-1960) was based on assessment of the finite fatigue life 
during which an initially flaw-free part develops a crack of critical size. Repeated 
load testing was performed on Comet jets and it was for the first time recognized that 
initial cracks are nucleated at fraction (less than a quarter) of the structural fatigue 
life. 
Fail Safe Design (cca. 1960-1975) acknowledged the inevitability of the occurance 
and presence of fatigue cracks in aircrafts  structures. The design emphasizes the 
redundancy (multiple load paths) of the structure to promote the stress redistribution 
away from a cracked component and avoid brittle failure.  
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Sufficent opportunity is allowed for a timely detection of the damage and the role of 
accidentally incurred damage and corrosion was the first time incorporated into 
analyses. The criteria for the inspection intervals and detection of cracks was 
prescribed eventhough the limits on the maximum risk were not expilicitly defined. 
Damage Tolerant Design (cca. 1975 to present) assumes that fatigue cracks are 
inevitable. Fracture mechanics methods are applied to predict the number of load 
cycles leading fatigue failure in order to prescribe safe inspection intervals. Special 
attention is devoted to the determination of the residual strength of a damaged 
structure, rate of damage growth and multiple damage site nucleation and growth 
mechanism These concerns provide the basis for codes which must be used for the 
design of the new aircrafts and for the certification of the continued exploitation of 
aged aircrafts. 
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4. STATIC STRENGTH DESIGN 
The most common type of structural analysis is based on static strength. Static 
strength analysis predicts the strength or margin of safety of a structure, for a given 
loading condition and material strength. The loads are usually limit, ultimate, or 
'equivalent' dynamic loads. Many of these loads are specified by regulatory agency 
requirements. Static strength analysis is still the basis for structural certification, 
although additional types of analysis are now also required. There is a little 
regulatory guidance for choosing a static strength analysis method. The method 
chosen is usually left up to the manufacturer. Many are based on classical text book 
methods, but may have some slight modifications or use different data (based on 
additional testing). Many of these methods and data are proprietary to the 
manufacturer.  
The load relationship between limit design loads and ultimate design loads 
prescribed in the strength requirements is: 
Limit design load  X  Factor of safety (1.5) =Ultimate design load                       (4.1)     
Limit loads are the actual (maximum) loads applied to airplane structure for 
stipulated flight and ground conditions. If deflection under load significantly changes 
the distribution of external or internal loads, it has to be accounted for. The structure 
must be able to support limit loads without detrimental, permanent deformation. 
Under a rapid application of a load, structure, such as a wing, will deflect 
momentarily to a position beyond that for an equal static loading. This added 
dynamic effect and the resulting dynamic stresses must be considered. The ultimate 
design loads are the limit loads multiplied by a factor of safety. Airplane structure 
must sustain ultimate loads without failure. Except for certain special requirements, 
the required factor of safety is 1.5. It is intended to provide reserve strength over that 
required to sustain expected limit loads. This reserve strength requirement is based 
on experience. It covers material factors such as the ratio of yield to ultimate 
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strength, variation in mechanical properties, and size tolerances. It provides for 
unknown variations in loads, stresses, and stiffness. 
 
Figure 4.1: Stress-Strain Curves for Aluminum Alloy (Fty>0.67Ftu)  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Stress-Strain Curves for Aluminum Alloy (Fty<0.67Ftu)  
ftl: Actual stress at limit load 
ftu: Actual stress at limit load 
Fty: Materail yield strenght at 0.002 in./in. 
Ftu: Materail ultimate strenght 
MS: Margin of Safety 
The static strength requirements of metallic structure can best be explained through 
the use of stress-strain curves as shown in figure 4.1 and 4.2 [9]. The modulus of 
elasticity (E) is the slope of the curve in the elastic range during which the strain is 
directly proportional to the stress. The tensile yield strength (Fty) is the stress level at 
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which the metal reaches its maximum measurable elastic limit. The maximum 
measurable elastic limit is defined as a permanent deformation of .002 in/in. The 
ultimate tensile strength (Ftu) is the maximum stress level observed prior to fracture 
or failure of the metal. Since the metal must be able to carry limit loads without any 
detrimental permanent deformation, the resulting design limit stress (ftl) is generally 
less than the yield strength of the metal (Fty). Similarly, the structure must withstand 
ultimate loads without failure. The resulting design ultimate stress (ftu) must not 
exceed the ultimate tensile strength (Ftu). In most instances, Ftu will be the critical 
stress, but when 1.5 Fty is less than Ftu the critical stress will be 1.5 Fty. The margin 
of safety for a simple linear case is:  
MS = (Ftu/ftu – 1) X 100                     (4.2) 
For all other cases the margin of safety is based on the allowable load (Pall) and the 
applied load (Papp): 
MS = (Pall/Papp – 1) X 100                                                  (4.3)   
The magnitude of the alowable damage on a component is a direct function of the 
margin of safety in the original design. 
4.1 Deficiencies of Static Strength Analysis 
Experience shows that static strength analysis does not satisfy all the requirements 
for modern airplane  structural integrity. For example, static strength cannot predict 
the fatigue life of the structure. Static strength does not predict the loss of strength, 
due to the presence of cracks or other stress concentrations (residual strength). 
In the early days of aviation, the deficiencies of static strength analysis did not pose a 
major hazard. This was partially due to low yield strength of the available materials. 
The low yield strength also meant a high fracture toughness, which minimizes the 
effects of fatigue cracking and residual strength. In addition, early airplane usually 
had short operational lives. This also minimized the effects of fatigue cracking and 
residual strength. Today's airplanes last much longer, accumulating more fatigue 
cycles. The usual design service objective for a commercial airliner is 20 years. 
Airplanes are remaining in service longer. These longer lives necessitate methods of 
analysis to ensure structural integrity as the airplane ages. 
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5. SAFE LIFE DESIGN 
In aerospace, fatigue life evaluation has been specifically based in the past on what is 
defined as safe-life design. Safe-life means that the component/aircraft is designed 
such that it is virtually able to withstand its whole design-life inspection free. Once 
the design life has expired, the component has to be removed, irrespective of having 
fractured or not [10].  Advisory Circular 25.571-1C defines safe-life as: “Safe-life of 
a structure is that number of events such as flights, landings, or flight hours, during 
which there is a low probability that the strength will degrade below its design 
ultimate value due to fatigue cracking.” [11]. 
Reliance of safe-life principles for continued airworthiness of early commercial 
airplanes were to some degree successful. This was primarily due to rapid technology 
developments rendering airplanes obsolete before serious challenges of the 
established life limits. Conversion of World War II bombers to airliners caused some 
airworthiness authority concerns which resulted in limits of operational lives and/or 
initiated measures for nondestructive testing. In the 1950s, it became clear that static 
strength criteria had to be supplemented by estimated replacement times for some 
critical structural elements such as spar beams on  numerous one-spar and two-spar 
wings. Many such configurations had evolved during the military bomber type 
developments during World War II. It became clear that fatigue failures would likely 
be due to use of high strength aluminum alloys without corresponding increase in 
fatigue strength. Further compounding the problem was improved stress analysis 
methods coupled with detailed and full-scale static testing of structural components, 
which often would eliminate past hidden static strength margins.  
The knowledge of actual operating conditions also became more extensive which 
provided more precise static strength analyses based on rational ultimate design 
conditions. Important lessons were learned and fatigue test requirements emerged. 
Repeated load testing was for instance performed on the Comet I in 1950. These tests 
were carried out on the same wings used for ultimate static strength tests.  
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The influence of these high loads on cumulative fatigue damage is today self evident 
but not recognized at the time. It was also recognized through experience that first 
defects in the fleets could occur at less than a quarter of the test demonstrated life. 
The attempts to design for a certain life was gradually changed to control fatigue life 
by limiting major component service lives. 
The use of imprecise and inaccurate fatigue analyses coupled with inherent material 
scatter characteristics often resulted in unnecessarily short lives and many sound 
structures were retired prematurely. Implementing safe-life principles often resulted 
in political problems for some airplane types in service in different countries. The 
overall problem with the safe-life principles were indeed that an acceptable 
commercial airliner safety standard could not be economically achieved [12]. 
 
  
Figure 5.1: Example of Safe Life Structure  
An example is given in figure 5.1, [13]. Single-load path structures are sometimes 
more simple in production (economic aspect), but in view of fatigue high safety 
factors are required, which implies a lower allowable design stress and a heavier 
component [14]. 
A structure designed as safe life contains a single load path only and the inspectable 
crack length may be in the range of the critical crack length. Consequently inspection 
intervals to monitor the structure cannot be defined.  
A failure of one of the structural elements leads to the complete failure of the safe 
life structure and possibly to significant consequences for the aircraft.  
   23
A fatigue resistant design of safe life structure is based on fatigue life calculations for 
all structural elements during the design phase and is justified by full scale fatigue 
test with the complete safe structure. The fatigue life calculations are performed 
using the linear damage accumulation according to Palmgren-Miner considering 
relevant load spectra and material (S-N) data. The calculated fatigue life as well as 
the achieved test life are divided by relevant scatter factors. [15] 
5.1 Deficiencies of Safe Life Design 
The safe-life design principle has a very conservative approach. Cracking is not 
allowed during a component's design life, therefore safe-life structures require 
extensive fatigue testing. This is expensive and time consuming. These requirements 
result in structures which are heavier than parts designed to fail-safe design 
principles. So, safe-life design is usually limited to structures which cannot be fail-
safe, or where adequate inspections are impractical. Today, safe-life design 
principles are typically limited to ground loaded structures such as high strength 
landing gear steel components for which substantial fatigue test verification is 
required. Safe-life principles can also result in the large economic impacts. If major 
structural components must be replaced often, the airplane may not be cost effective 
to operate. 
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6. FAIL SAFE DESIGN 
Advisory Circular 25.571-1C [11] defines fail safety as: “The attribute of the 
structure that permits it to retain its required residual strength for a period of 
unrepaired use after the failure or partial failure of a principal structural element.” 
This definition is applicable to all structural concepts. Residual strength is simply 
“the strength of a damaged structure.” The phrase “required residual strength” relates 
to the capability of the damaged structure being consistent with the required load 
level.  
The fail-safe design principle uses multiple load paths to ensure structural integrity. 
If one load path cracks completely through, or sustains accidental damage, the 
remaining load paths carry the additional load. Examples include: Multiple stringers 
and ribs in wings, Multiple wing panels, Multiple stringers and frames in fuselage 
construction (This construction also breaks the fuselage skin into redundant panels), 
Bonded and bolted fittings (often called 'back-to-back‘ fittings), and bonded and 
bolted landing gear beams.  
Static strength analysis of these structures, with one element severed, satisfies the 
certification requirement for fail-safety. The loads for fail-safe design conditions are 
called 'fail-safe loads'. These usually correspond to limit load conditions.  
The fail-safe principle also requires that any damage will be detected during an 
inspection, and then repaired. Some types of damage produce effects that are 
obvious, such as flapping fuselage skin panels, or wing fuel tank leaks. This obvious 
damage is considered part of the fail-safe inspections. Fail safe design philosophy 
has been a fundamental design requirement for aircraft manufacturers. Fail safe 
designs provide inherent robustness in the event of significant structural damage 
from several possible sources. Sources include fatigue damage, environmental 
deterioration, accidental damage, maintenance errors, manufacturing flaws and 
discrete events such as engine burst and impact damage. 
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The application of the fail-safe concept to structural design is based on the 
fundamental idea that a failure or obvious partial failure of a single principle 
structural element shall not cause the loss of the aircraft while in flight through [16]:  
• Complete structural element collapse.  
• Large deflections resulting in loss of control such as 
- Large wing deflections which may make flight impossible 
- Flap assymmetry 
• Flutter, whether it is of a fixed or movable surface.  
• A component failure such as a turbine engine bleed duct which in turn could blow 
up a wing, fuselage or empennage.  
• A change in the aerodynanuc characteristics such that continued flight is 
impossible.  
 
Figure 6.1: Fail Safe Design Requirements 
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An example could be complete loss of a wing leading edge where a partial loss 
would be survivable. Structural failures can be result of a wide variety of 
misfortunes. The degree or of a single principle structural element failure has not 
been defined, however some interpretations have been made thereto. If a structural 
assembly such as a wing box were made up of a relatively large number of elements 
such as integrally stiffened planks comprising the wing surfaces, a single failure 
would be the complete severence of one "plank". Similarly, a single failure could 
involve the severence of a beam cap or a shear web of the wing beam. Fail-safe 
design requirements are illustrated in Figure 6.1. Wing fail safety example is shown 
in Figure 6.2 [17]. Spanwise joints provide capability to sustain failure of any one 
skin panel.  
 
Figure 6.2: Wing Fail Safety 
6.1 Fail Safe Design Deficiencies 
Experiences have shown that fail safe design produces structure with a credible but 
imperfect safety record. Fail-safe design is a good philosophy, and worked well for 
many decades. In fact, fail-safe design still provides the basis for most new airplane 
designs. However, operational experience shows that some of the assumptions of 
fail-safety do not hold true. Cracks usually develop in several elements at the same 
time, making the alternate load paths weaker. This is called multiple site cracking. 
A/C manufacturers cannot always rely on obvious damage to alert operators to 
structural problems before they become catastrophic. Corrosion weakens alternate 
load paths, and accelerates crack growth. To compensate for these deficiencies in 
fail-safe design, the damage tolerance philosophy was developed. 
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 7. DAMAGE TOLERANT DESIGN 
Damage tolerance is the attribute of the structure that permits it to retain its required 
residual strength for a period of use after the structure has sustained a given level of 
fatigue, corrosion, accidental or discrete source damage [11].  Another word, it is the 
ability of the structure to sustain damage in the form of cracks, without catastrophic 
consequences, until such time that the damaged component can be repaired until the 
economic service life is expired and the airplane or component retired [18]. 
Since the likely development and growth of the damage may be established by 
analysis, it is possible to develop a structural maintenance programme, with a series 
of scheduled inspections and replacements to ensure that catastrophic structural 
failure will be avoided throughout the operational life of the aircraft. 
The damage tolerance evaluation required by FAR 25.571 is apparently intended to 
consider the effects of fatigue damage, environmental damage (e.g. corrosion) and 
accidental damage. Design precautions are taken to minimize the risk of corrosion 
damage, and any corrosion that does occur is generally in areas not sensitive to 
fatigue, such as the lower part of fuselage, and can be removed as soon as discovered 
by an adequate maintenance programme. As a result, the impact of corrosion on the 
fatigue characteristics of the structure is not considered, and the fatigue and corrosion 
inspection programmes are developed separately, both taking account of the 
accentuated deterioration due to likely accidental damage.  
The damage tolerance evaluation can therefore be understood with a crack 
propagation and residual strength analysis for structural elements subject to ‘natural’ 
or ‘accidental’ fatigue damage only. The assessment involves consideration of the 
probable damage locations, the extent of damage, crack initiation mechanisms, crack 
growth time histories and crack detectability.  
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The results of these analyses, which are supported by extensive fatigue test evidence, 
are subsequently used to establish a suitable programme of inspections for each 
fatigue-critical area of the structure, which should consist of the method of 
inspection, the inspection threshold, and the repeat inspection interval.  
Damage tolerance can be achieved more easily by incorporating fail-safety features, 
such as redundancy, multiple load paths and crack arresters. Fail-safe structures can 
sustain larger damage, but if unattended this damage will eventually still cause a 
catastrophic failure. Hence, fail-safety features by themselves do not prevent 
fracture: the partial failure (e.g. the failed load path) still must be detected and 
repaired; even if the structure is fail-safe, inspection is essential to achieve safety. 
Without fail-safety features the structure can still be damage tolerant, provided 
cracks are detected and repaired before they impair the safety. Fail-safety features 
merely alleviate the inspection problem. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Strength Requirements for Damage Tolerant Structure 
Damage tolerant analysis begins with the same static strength calculations as non-
damage tolerant structure. This includes analyses for ultimate, limit, and failsafe 
design conditions.  
A/C manufacturers perform fatigue analysis to ensure the economic design life goals. 
Finally, they perform crack-growth and residual strength predictions. Crack growth 
prediction assumes initial cracks which are too small to detect and then they predict 
how much the cracks grow during normal airplane operations.  
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When the cracks grow to a certain size, you can detect them. Residual strength 
predictions tell how the presence of the fatigue cracks affect the strength of fail-safe 
elements. They also tell how the presence of undetected accidental damage affects 
the strength of remaining fail-safe elements.  
Manufacturers use the crack growth and residual strength predictions to establish 
maximum crack sizes. They also establish how many inspection opportunities exist 
to find a given crack. This ensures that airplane damage is detected, and repaired 
before the strength is below a minimum level. 
Certification of commercial jet transports mandates damage tolerant designs in all 
instances where it can be used without unreasonable penalty. The technical capability 
has evolved to relate inspection requirements to damage growth which, in the past, 
were based on service experience. Primary airframe components are designed to 
meet specific static and dynamic loading conditions that greatly exceed normal 
operating loads. Graphical representation of damage tolerance is shown in Figure 
7.1. Maximum structural strength capability occurs at the beginning of an airplane's 
life. The operating loads are much smaller than the ultimate strength. As the airplane 
ages, the strength slowly reduces, due to crack growth and/or corrosion damage. 
Before the strength becomes less than the residual requirement, the damage is 
detected and repaired back to original capability. Note that there are several 
opportunities for damage detection. This process continues throughout the life of the 
airplane.  
Laboratory developed probability of detection (POD) curves are often relied upon in 
service environments beyond what is justified by experimental evidence. This is an 
even more serious problem when these methods are called upon to search an area for 
unknown defects rather than to confirm the presence of a specified type and location. 
Cracks missed during inspections are often not properly accounted for in POD data. 
Visual inspection has been and will continue to be the main source of initial 
detection of previously unknown damage in most commercial jet transport structures. 
The lack of interest and resolve in the research community to characterize and 
quantify visual POD data is indeed perplexing.  
As the airplane progresses through its service life, damage may occur and reduce 
static strength capability (residual strength). Structure is damage tolerant if damage 
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that may occur, can be discovered and repaired before the residual strength falls 
below the regulatory failsafe capability. The damage detection period is dependent 
on structural characteristics as well as maintenance and inspection procedures. Once 
damage has been detected, strength must be restored to the ultimate design level. 
Aging airplane structure may be affected by widespread fatigue damage that alters 
the detection requirements. This is due to the effect of local damage at multiple sites 
on residual strength capability [12].  
7.1 Single Load Path – Damage Tolerant  
It is the structure with a single load path, with a residual strength under limit load 
with a crack of a bigger size than the detectable size. The certification authorities 
allow these structures, although they are not recommended.  The inspection interval 
is based on the growth of the crack, from its detectable size up to its critical size. 
Therefore, these structures are designed so that possible cracks grow slowly enough 
to increase the growth period and provide reasonable inspection intervals. An 
example of a structure of this type is a wing intrados with integrated stringers as the 
one shown on figure 7.2 [13,15]. 
  
 
Figure 7.2: Example of Single Load Path Structure – Damage Tolerant 
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7.2 Multiple Load Path – Damage Tolerant  
It is a structure with more than one load path that can withstand the limit load with 
one of them completely broken. There are three kinds of structures, depending on its 
inspection way.  
7.2.1 Structure externally inspectable 
In this type of structures one of the load paths (primary) is located on the internal 
part of the structure and due to the difficulty to inspect it, either because of the access 
or by the inspection method, it is not possible to detect cracks on it. Therefore, the 
secondary load path is externally inspected. The crack on the primary path grows up 
to its critical size with no detection possible, and once the primary path is broken, the 
load is re-distributed, and the crack on the secondary path keeps on growing up to its 
detectable size and further its critical size. The inspection interval is based on the 
growth of the crack on the secondary path from its detectable size up to its critical 
size. This type of structures is recommended for most of the primary structures 
formed by rigid panels (e.g., wing and fuselage skins). It is also recommended that 
the critical size is bigger than or equal to two distances between stiffeners (two bay 
cracks) with the central one broken. An example of this type of structure can be a 
skin with riveted stringers where there is no possibility to inspect the stringer 
externally, figure 7.2 [13,15]. 
 
Figure 7.3: Example of Multiple Load Path Structure Externally Inspectable  
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7.2.2 Non inspectable for less than one load path failure 
In this type of structures, the primary load path is such, that the crack can only be 
detected when the load path is broken. Therefore, the crack of the primary path 
grows up to its critical size and then it breaks; at that moment it becomes detectable. 
From that moment onwards, the load is re-distributed and the crack on the secondary 
path keeps on growing up to its critical size. Then, the inspection interval is based on 
the growth of the crack of the secondary path, from the time the primary breaks up to 
its critical size. An example of this type of structure can be that of double lugs (e.g., 
the joint of horizontal stabilizer to the fuselage), figure 7.3 [13,15]. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Example of Multiple Load Path Structure Not 
Inspectable for Less than Load Path Failure 
7.2.3 Inspectable for less than one load failure 
They are structures with load paths that can be inspected with a detectable size lower 
than the element breakage size. Therefore, a crack can be detected on the primary 
element before it breaks. Once the primary path is broken, the load is redistributed 
and the crack on the secondary path keeps on growing up to its critical size. The 
inspection interval is based on the growth of both cracks from the moment the 
primary is detected up to the critical size of the secondary path (with the primary 
path broken). An example of this type of structure can be that of an integrated skin 
formed by several plates riveted, as shown on figure 7.4. [13,15]. 
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Figure 7.4: Example of Multiple Load Path Structure Inspectable for  
Less Than Load Path Failure 
7.3 Elements of Damage Tolerance 
Damage tolerance has three main elements (Figure 7.5) interrelated and any change 
to one of these elements has an effect on the other  two elements. [2] 
 Residual (allowable) Strength  Predictions 
 Crack (damage) Growth Predictions 
 Inspection Programs (damage detection) 
 
 
Figure 7.5: There Main Elements of Damage Tolerance 
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7.3.1 Residual strength (Allowable damage) 
The static strength of a simple structural element is usually  defined as Ftu x A. 
However, this definition is not valid where cracks exist in the element. The stress 
concentration produced by the crack makes the load carrying capability much less 
than the net area multiplied by the allowable stress.  
To prevent catastrophic failure, one must evaluate the load carrying capacity that will 
exist in the potentially cracked structure throughout its expected service life. The 
load carrying capacity of a cracked structure is the residual strength of that structure 
and it is a function of material toughness, crack size, crack geometry and structural 
configuration. The determination of residual strength for uncracked structures is 
straightforward because the ultimate strength of the material is the residual strength.  
A crack in a structure causes a high stress concentration resulting in a reduced 
residual strength, as shown in figure 7.6 . When the load on the structure exceeds a 
certain limit, the crack will extend. The crack extension may become immediately 
unstable and the crack may propagate in a fast uncontrollable manner causing 
complete fracture of the component. In general, unstable crack propagation results in 
fracture of the  component. Hence, unstable crack growth is what determines the 
residual strength. In order to estimate the residual strength of a structure, a thorough 
understanding of the crack growth behavior is needed. Also, the point at which the 
crack growth becomes unstable must be defined and this necessitates the need for a 
failure criterion. There are several criteria available; these criteria are tailored to 
represent the ability of a material to resist failure.  
 
Figure 7.6: Residual Strength vs Crack Lenght 
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7.3.2 Crack growth (Damage growth) 
Classical fatigue analysis can determine how many cycles occur before a metal 
specimen initiates a crack. It does not tell the rate or size of crack growth. Residual 
strength analysis determines the critical crack size. Crack growth analysis tells the 
number of flights for a small (undetectable) crack to grow to the critical crack size. 
Crack growth rate depends on the material and the loading spectrum. Materials with 
high fracture toughness usually have slower crack growth rates than materials with 
low fracture toughness.  
The interval of damage progression from lengths below which there is negligible 
probability of detection to an allowable size determined by residual strength 
requirements. A crack in a structure will increase in size in response to application of 
cyclic loads.  
As shown schematically in figure 7.7, growth is negligible when the crack is very 
small. Since these effects are nearly impossible to observe, it can be argued that 
some tiny flaws are always present in a structure. An alternative interpretation is that 
a small crack is initiated in perhaps 5% of the time range of the diagram due to a 
manufacturing flaw or material inclusion and then grows during the greater part of 
the time range to failure. As the crack increases in size, increments of extension get 
larger until a critical dimension is attained at which the structure fractures in the 
course of a single cycle of loading. 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Crack Growth in Response to Cyclic Loads 
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7.3.3 Damage detection (Inspection program) 
The purpose of damage tolerance inspections is to discover damage, before the 
structures residual strength capability falls below the residual strength requirement. 
Residual strength prediction tells what size the cracks correspond to minimum 
strength (critical crack length). Crack growth prediction tells how quickly cracks will 
grow to the critical length. A/C manufacturers choose the inspection interval so that a 
crack smaller than the detection threshold can’t grow to critical length before the 
next inspection period. This is called the damage detection period. The detectable 
crack size depends on the inspection method. Some methods can find very small 
cracks (high frequency eddy current, for example). Other methods can only find 
larger cracks (general visual inspection, for example). The detectable crack size (and 
therefore the inspection method) affects how often the inspection is required. 
 
Figure 7.8: Crack Lenght Versus Inspection Methods  
Crack growth life is the time (measured, for example, in terms of number of flights) 
it takes a crack to grow from some initial length to a critical size that reduces the 
strength margin to zero. An initial size at which the crack can be detected marks the 
start of this time scale. The purpose of damage tolerance analysis is to ensure that 
crack growth life is greater than any accumulation of service loads that could drive a 
crack to a dangerous size. This objective can be achieved with an inspection program 
that detects cracking initiated by fatigue, accident, or corrosion before propagation to 
failure. Inspection frequencies must be at intervals that are fractions of expected 
growth life to afford the opportunity for corrective action that maintains structural 
safety if cracks are found. The economic feasibility of an inspection plan must 
consider the cost trade-off between inspection methods and intervals, figure 7.8. 
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8. CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS CHALLENGES 
Each new airplane model enters service in airworthy condition, built to meet all the 
design goals set for its anticipated service life. However, variations in operating 
environments, different maintenance practices, and the ability to remain in service 
much longer than originally anticipated can lead to significantly different structural 
performance over time.  
Continuing airworthiness concerns for aging jet transports has received attention 
over the last two decades. Supplemental structural inspection programs were 
developed in the late 1970s to address fatigue cracking detection in airplanes 
designed to the fail-safe principles. These evaluations were performed in accordance 
with updated damage tolerance regulations to reflect the state-of-the-art in residual 
strength and crack growth analyses based on fracture mechanics principles. Damage 
at multiple sites was also addressed in terms of dependent damage size distributions 
in relation to assumed lead cracks in different structural members. Structural audits 
were performed in the mid 1980s to ascertain whether these supplemental inspection 
programs addressed independent multiple site damage in similar structural details 
subjected to similar stresses. The safe decompression concepts were challenged in 
these reviews of different manufacturer damage tolerance philosophies but no major 
changes occurred. 
 
Figure 8.1: Industry Aging Fleet Initiatives 
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The Aloha Airlines failure identified a need to pay particular attention to aircraft 
which had accumulated a high number of flight cycles. As invariably a high number 
of flight cycles were associated with older aircraft, the aftermath of the Aloha 
incident rise to the so-called Aging Aircraft Program which was launched in the early 
1980s. To assist their deliberations on how best to address the aging aircraft problem, 
the FAA recruited the help of a number of industry experts and formed the 
Airworthiness Assurance Task Force (AATF) in 1988. This group was subsequently 
renamed the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG) of the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) which was formed by in 1991. Many of 
the aging aircraft in existence at the time the AAWG was formed had not been 
designed on a damage tolerant basis as this had not been made a regulatory 
requirement until the introduction of FAR 25.571 Amendment 45 in December 1978. 
Consequently, the AAWG decided that their first priority was to implement 
programs for fail safe certified aircraft that would subject them to an equivalent level 
of inspection and maintenance scrutiny as that to which damage tolerance certified 
aircraft were subjected. The AAWG defined a number of programs, some of which 
have been subsequently implemented on the different aging aircraft fleets by aircraft 
specific Structures Task Groups (STGs), as shown in figure 8.1. 
 8.1 Service Bulletin Reviews 
Continuing airworthiness of jet transport structures designed to the fail-safe 
principles has traditionally been ensured by inspection programs. In the event of 
known, specific fatigue cracking and/or corrosion problems that if not detected and 
repaired, had the potential to cause a significant degradation in airworthiness, the 
normal practice in the past was to introduce a service bulletin.  
The net result of this process was to carry out inspections of all affected airplanes 
until damage was detected and then to perform the repair. Thus, continuing structural 
airworthiness was totally dependent on repetitive inspections. Aging airplane 
concerns prompted reassessment of the viability of indefinite repetitive inspections. 
[12] With increasing in-service experience, the type certificate holder or 
supplemental type certificate holder may find ways to improve the original design 
resulting in either lower maintenance costs or increased performance.  
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These improvements (normally involving some alterations) are suggested through 
service bulletins to their customers as optional (and may be extra cost) items. The 
customers may exercise their discretion whether or not to incorporate the bulletins. 
Evaluation process of this service bulletins may vary between operators. Different 
types of service bulletins are issued by TC holder/STC holder/OEMs.  
For example, Boeing issues special attention, alert and standard type service bulletins 
to recommend inspection procedures method, threshold and interval which were 
designed to ensure with high (but undefined) degree of probability that the structural 
damage would be detected and be repaired before significant degradation in 
structural airworthiness occurred.   
Frequently these service bulletins would also specify modifications/rework 
procedures that would eliminate the cause of the cracking problems and provide an 
alternative to repetitive inspections as a means of ensuring continued structural 
integrity. The inspection parts of the service bulletins were sometimes mandated by 
Airworthiness Directives. Most of the Alert Service Bulletins will result to issue of 
an AD.  
Boeing's recommended compliance times in alert service bulletins are based on many 
factors considered during the safety analysis process, managing the risk being the 
most prominent of those considerations.  
In conjunction with the lead airline review process, the FAA also reviews, comments 
on, and approves Boeing's mitigation plan and compliance recommendations. The 
FAA has recognized that there is additional time allocated to comply if the AD 
release is significantly later than Boeing's alert service bulletin release. The FAA's 
actions are based on their risk assessment, whether qualitative or quantitative, and 
the FAA's risk assessment governs their establishment of compliance periods. On the 
other hand, Special Attention Service Bulletin's (SAB) are reserved for less urgent 
safety issues (quite often personal safety) or significant economic issues. They 
remain a heritage Puget Sound-unique variation of standard service bulletins. 
The additional tagging and verbiage associated with SABs are meant to increase 
operators' attention to consider our recommendations for incorporation. Sometimes 
ADs will result from SABs; for these cases, as with Alert SBs, the FAA's 
Compliance requirements apply. 
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Following lines provides details of the criteria used by Airbus to issue compliance 
recommendations for service bulletins. In accordance with recommendations 
contained in the ATA 2200 specifications, Airbus service bulletins are issued with a 
reason paragraph giving background information on the modification as well as 
guidance for implementation decision thus enabling Operators to establish retrofit 
requirements with respect to their own fleet experience. In addition, Airbus allocates 
a compliance classification as well as an accomplishment timescale which are 
derived from the decision process specified in ATA 2200. 
Mandatory: This category is allocated if the accomplishment is rendered mandatory 
through an Airworthiness Directive (Consigne de Navigabilité) issued by the French 
DGAC to ensure adequate safety level in accordance with JAR39. The 
timescale/limitation contained in the relevant Consigne de Navigabilité is referenced 
under accomplishment timescale within the compliance paragraph. 
Recommended: This category has been developed to incorporate major 
enhancements regarding aircraft operation: 
Operation: Modifications which significantly improve the level of airworthiness 
compliance regarding combined failure modes/system issues identified during 
aircraft operation.  
Maintenance: Modifications which provide terminating action on disruptive 
inspections, mandatory or otherwise; or prevent costly repairs. Airbus strongly 
encourages that operators/owners accomplish service bulletins in this category in 
accordance with the recommended timescale so as to upgrade the affected aircraft to 
the latest available standard. 
Desirable: This category is allocated if the service bulletin offers improvements in 
terms of dispatch reliability, maintenance cost, maintenance program reduction, 
operational benefits, crew/passenger comfort or regulated environmental nuisance. 
The Accomplishment Timescale is left to the Operator's entire decision. 
Optional: This category is allocated if the service bulletin has been developed on a 
specific operator/owner request the accomplishment timescale is left to the operator’s 
own decision.  
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8.2 Corrosion Prevention and Control Programs 
Corrosion defines as “the electrochemical deterioration of a metal because of its 
chemical reaction with the surrounding environment.” [19]. Corrosion has always 
been recognized as a major factor in airplane aintenance. Each airline/operator 
addresses it differently according to its operating environment and needs. It became 
apparent that without effective corrosion control programs, the frequency and 
severity of corrosion are increasing with airplane age and, as such, corrosion was 
more likely to be associated with other forms of damage such as fatigue cracking.  
Corrosion control in the aerospace industry has always been important, but is 
becoming more so with the ageing of the aircraft fleet. As the aircraft ages, fleets 
experinece increased number of structural failures and excessive maintenance cost 
and increased downtime. If the corrosion is not detected and treated at earlier stages, 
catastrophic consequences would likely to occur.  For that reason, aircraft 
manufacturers have published Corrosion Prevention and Control Manuals  (CPCM) 
and guidelines to assist the operators/airlines. Commercial aircraft age in service, the 
structures experience many forms of corrosion (details of corrosion types can be 
found in [19]), dependent on the alloy and temper, the finish, the assembly design 
and location on the airplane, the drainage, and the internal and external 
environments.   
Unattended, these may become serious airworthiness issues. In the United States, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that the manufacturer “… show that 
catastrophic failure due to fatigue, corrosion or accidental damage, will be avoided 
throughout the operational life of the airplane …” [20] for that the airline operator to 
have a plan to address corrosion problems and reduce their severity between 
inspections. “Each certificate holder is primarily responsible for the airworthiness of 
its aircraft … the performance of the maintenance … in accordance with its manual 
and the regulations …” [21]. This, if allowed to continue, could lead to an 
unacceptable degradation of structural integrity, and in an extreme instance, the loss 
of an airplane. The working groups have recognized the need for a universal baseline 
minimum corrosion control program for all airplanes to prevent corrosion from 
affecting airworthiness. Maximum commonality of approach within and between 
each manufacturer to ensure consistent and effective procedures throughout the 
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world have been a key objective for the working groups. The program requirements 
apply to all airplanes that have reached or exceeded the specified implementation age 
threshold for each airplane area. The specific intervals and thresholds vary between 
models, but all programs follow the same basic philosophy.   
8.2.1 Corrosion prevention and control methods 
There are a number of diffenet approaches to improve the ability of corrosion 
resistance of  a material, component, or systems.  Corrosion prevention and control 
(CPAC) methods,  can be divided up into six main groups [22]:   
Organic or Inorganic coatings: Coatings are the easiest, most effective, and least 
expensive Corroison Prebevtion and Control method available. Durable metallic, 
inorganic, and organic coatings are frequently used for providing short or longterm 
corrosion protection of metals from various types of corrosive media.  
There are two main types of coatings: barrier coatings and sacrificial coatings. A 
barrier coating acts as a shield, which isolates the metal being protected from the 
surrounding corrosive environment. Barrier coatings are typically unreactive, 
resistant to corrosion, and also protect against wear. Sacrificial coatings 
preferentially corrode, which is an effective mechanism for protecting the cathodic 
substrate.  
Surface Treatments: These treatments modify a material’s surface to improve its 
corrosion resistance. Chemical conversion  coating and anodizing techniques employ 
chemical reactions to create a stable, corrosion resistant oxide film on the metal’s 
surface. Shot peening is a mechanical process that induces compressive residual 
stresses on the surface, thus improving resistance to stress corrosion cracking and 
corrosion fatigue. Laser treatments can modify the surface characteristics of a 
materialincluding its hardness and morphology.   
As a result, certain forms of corrosion may be mitigated or prevented. Laser shock 
peening is a process somewhat analogous to shot peening in that it too can induce 
compressive residual stresses within a metal’s surface region to increase its 
resistance to stress corrosion cracking and corrosion fatigue. 
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Corrosion Preventive Compounds (CPCs):  CPCs offer temporary protection against 
corrosion and as such, are materials that need to be reapplied during scheduled 
maintenance. They come in four basic types [23]: 
 Water displacing soft films 
 Water displacing hard films 
 Non-water displacing soft films 
 Non-water displacing hard films 
Water displacing CPCs penetrate small cracks and crevices, force out any water that 
may be present, and leave behind a protective film. These films can be oil, grease, 
solvent, or resin based. They repel water  or they can contain corrosion inhibitors. 
Inhibitors: Inhibitors are chemicals that either react with the surface of a material to 
decrease its corrosion rate, or modify the operational environment to reduce its 
corrosivity. Inhibitors may be dissolved in an aqueous solution or dispersed in a 
protective film. For instance, they can be injected into a completely aqueous 
recirculating system to reduce the corrosion rate in that system.   
They may also be used as additives in coating products, such as surface treatments, 
primers, sealants, hard coatings, and CPCs. Inhibitors are usually grouped into five 
different categories:  
 Passivating 
 Cathodic 
 Film forming 
 Precipitation 
 Vapor phase. 
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Cathodic and Anodic Protection: Cathodic protection (CP) is a widely used 
electrochemical method for protecting a structure or important components of a 
system from corrosion. There are two main classes of cathodic protection: active and 
passive. Active cathodic protection, also called impressed-current cathodic protection 
(ICCP), uses an external power supply to provide an electrical current to the surface 
of a metal. The excess electrons at the surface feed the corrosive medium, thereby 
protecting the metal from being stripped of its electrons, which would otherwise 
result in corrosion of the metal. Passive CP systems are simpler than ICCP systems 
and involve the galvanic coupling of the metal being protected to a sacrificial anode, 
which protects the adjoining surface by freely giving up electrons and in the process 
preferentially corroding.  
Anodic protection is a more recently developed but less frequently used method of 
corrosion control. Using an applied electrical current, this method actively creates a 
passive film on the surface of the material being protected. For some applications, 
the current can be sustained during the material’s service life, in order to maintain the 
passive film. Passive films are very non-reactive and consequently materials that 
possess them are resistant to corrosion. The method is typically employed to protect 
materials that are exposed to strongly alkaline or acidic environments. Anodic 
protection can only be used on metals capable of forming a passive film such as 
stainless steels.  
Strategic Methods: Design, maintenance, and material selection can be strategically 
used to minimize the extent to which a material, component or system corrodes 
during its lifetime. Simple elements incorporated into a design can lessen the risk of 
corrosion. For example, allowing for drainage of water that otherwise might become 
trapped can effectively reduce corrosion problems. Similarly, employing seals to 
preclude water from entering a component or system will improve its corrosion 
resistance. Another effective way to minimize corrosion is to use gaskets to 
electrically insulate two dissimilar metals, thus eliminating the possibility of galvanic 
corrosion. Employing a maintenance schedule where a vehicle or structure is 
periodically cleaned will help reduce corrosion.  
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Salt and debris buildup on vehicles or structures, for example, can accelerate 
corrosion. Therefore, routinely washing them to remove the contaminants is a sound 
practice. In addition, regularly touching up protective coatings or reapplying CPCs 
will help reduce instances of corrosion. Perhaps the most important way to minimize 
corrosion from occurring in the first place is to make appropriate material selection 
decisions by carefully considering the application, environment, and potential 
corrosion problems that might occur. Selecting the appropriate materials and 
associated corrosion prevention and control practices can reduce maintenance costs 
and system downtime over the life-cycle of a system.  
8.2.2 Corrosion control program guidelines 
The possibility of an in-flight mishap or excessive downtime for structural repairs 
necessitates an active corrosion prevention and control program.  
The type and aggressiveness of the corrosion prevention and control program depend 
on the operational environment of the aircraft. Aircraft exposed to salt air, heavy 
atmospheric industrial pollution, and/or over water operations will require a more 
stringent corrosion prevention and control program than an aircraft that is operated in 
a dry environment.   
In order to prevent corrosion, a constant cycle of cleaning, inspection, operational 
preservation, and  lubrication must be followed. Prompt detection and removal of 
corrosion will limit the extent of damage to aircraft and aircraft components. The 
basic philosophy of a corrosion prevention and control program should consist of the 
following: [19] 
 Adequately trained personnel in the recognition of corrosion including 
conditions, detection and identification, cleaning, treating, and preservation; 
 Thorough knowledge of corrosion identification techniques; 
 Proper emphasis on the concept of all hands responsibility for corrosion 
control surfaces, 
 Inspection for corrosion on a scheduled basis,  
 Aircraft washing at regularly scheduled intervals, 
 Routine cleaning or wipe down of all exposed unpainted surfaces, 
 Keeping drain holes and passages open and functional, 
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 Inspection, removal, and reapplication of preservation compounds on a 
scheduled basis, 
 Early detection and repair of damaged protective coatings, 
 Thorough cleaning, lubrication, and preservation at prescribed intervals, 
  Prompt corrosion treatment after detection, 
  Accurate record keeping and reporting of material or design  deficiencies 
 Use of appropriate materials, equipment, and technical publications. 
8.3 Baseline Maintenance Program Reviews 
Operators/airlines must develop and document an approved maintenance program 
before introducing a new or derivative airplane into service. A/C manufacturers 
prepare a maintenance planning document (MPD) to assist operators in developing 
their own programs. Included in this document arc all maintenance review board 
(MRB) reporting requirements as well as manufacturer recommended tasks. Each 
operator has the final responsibility for its maintenance plan and adherence to 
maintenance schedules. 
8.4 Supplemental Inspection Program Reviews 
The manufacturer, in conjunction with operators, is expected to initiate development 
of a supplemental structural inspection program for each airplane model [24]. The 
purpose of this program was to ensure continued safe operation of the aging fleet by 
timely detection of new fatigue damage locations. The original Supplemental 
Inspection Documents (SID)  normally is based on predictions or assumptions (from 
analyses, tests and/or service experience) of failure modes, time to initial damage, 
frequency of damage, typically detectable damage, and the damage growth period.  
These documents have been updated on a regular basis to reflect service experience 
and operator inputs. In the light of current aging fleet concerns, these inspection 
programs were to ensure adequate protection of the aging fleet. The major focus of 
these reviews were [12]: 
• Adequacy of the present fleet leader sampling. 
• Inclusion/deletion of principal structural elements (PSE). 
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Such a program must be implemented before analysis, tests, and/or service 
experience indicates that a significant increase in inspection and/or modification is 
necessary to maintain structural integrity of the airplane. In the absence of other data 
as a guideline, the program should be initiated no later than the time when the high-
time or high-cycle airplane in the fleet reaches one half its design service goal. The 
initial candidate fleet leader samples comprised those airplanes exceeding 50% of the 
design objective in flight cycles when the typical fleet leader reached 75%.  
Basic structural reassessments of compromised of  the identification of structural 
parts or components which contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground, 
pressure or control loads whose failure could affect the structural integrity necessary 
for the safety of the airplane and whose damage tolerance or safe-life characteristics 
it is necessary, therefore, to establish or confirm. These are called Structural 
Significant Items (SSIs).   
The calculation of residual strength, with multiple site damage and interactive crack 
growth under typical flight and ground loading, such that the airplane structure can 
sustain the load conditions stated for failsafe qualification under the current FAR 
25.571 [20]. The establishment of a procedure for developing inspection programs 
that provide a high probability of detecting fatigue damage before residual strength 
falls below the fail-safe requirements. 
These documents includes the type of damage being considered, and likely sites; 
inspection access, threshold, interval, method and procedures; applicable 
modification status and/or life limitation; and types of operations for which the SID 
is valid. 
8.5 Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD) 
In 1988, the industry experienced a significant failure of the airworthiness system 
involving probable WFD. This failure allowed an airplane to fly with significant 
unrepaired fatigue damage. As a result the airplane, an Aloha Airlines 737, 
experienced a rapid fracture and loss of a portion of its fuselage in night.  As a direct 
consequence of this accident, the FAA hosted the International Conference on Aging 
Airplanes in June 1988 in Washington. D.C.  
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As an outcome of the conference, an organization of operators, manufacturers and 
regulators was formed under the U.S. Federal Advisory Committee Act to investigate 
and propose solutions to the problems evidenced by the accident. This group is now 
known as the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG). Since the 1988 
Aloha incident, the industry has identified three new WFD conditions in the fleet per 
year. The follow-on actions to the conference were published in a final report in June 
1999 [25]. 
Widespread fatigue damage (WFD) in a structure is characterized by the 
simultaneous presence of cracks at multiple structural components where the cracks 
are of sufficient size and density that the structure will no longer meet its damage 
tolerance requirement. The two sources of WFD are;  
Multiple Site Damage (MSD), characterized by the simultaneous presence of fatigue 
cracks in the same structural element; and  
Multiple Element damage (MED), characterized by the simultaneous presence of 
fatigue cracks in similar adjacent structural elements.  
An industry committee on WFD identified 16 generic types of structure susceptible 
to WFD as shown Appendix A. 
Since the Aloha accident in 1988, extensive research has been carried out on 
MSD/WFD. A brief survey of available MSD/WFD analysis guidelines and methods 
was performed by focusing on the major authorities and aircraft industries. In 
general, some useful technical guidelines were found in working documents from 
AAWG (Airworthiness Assurance Working Group) [26] and FAA (Federal Aviation 
Administration) [27] for MSD/WFD analysis/evaluation. In 1994, Airbus developed 
a Monte Carlo method for the WFD evaluation of the A300 fuselage, where random 
initial crack scenarios were determined by a lognormal distribution developed from 
simple coupon fatigue lives, and subsequent crack growth and failure was analyzed 
using fracture mechanics models [28].  In 2006, Lockheed Martin (LM) Aerospace 
developed an equivalent initial flaw size (EIFS) based Monte Carlo method to 
perform risk analyses of C-130 build-up structures [29]. On the subject of risk 
assessment as it might apply to managing MSD/MED situations, it was 
acknowledged that considerable advances had occurred in this area recently.  
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The effect of MSD is shown on figure 8.2 . In the presence of MSD adjacent to a 
lead crack the residual strength is reduced drastically.  
The drop of the residual strength from the capability of the intact structure to the 
capability to withstand the design loads occurs in a much shorter time compared to 
the case of a local damage. Furthermore the crack growth for an MSD scenario is 
increased compared with the single crack.  
Together with the reduced critical crack length this results in a significantly reduced 
crack growth period between the detectable and the critical situation. The Industry 
Committee on WFD has evaluated the experience o the participating manufacturers 
based on the results of large component and full scale fatigue tests as well as in 
service experience in order to identify the locations potentially susceptible to WFD. 
From this compilation of data each area was assessed for its susceptibility to WFD 
and was then characterized as either multiple element and/or multiple site damage.  
 
Figure 8.2: Effect of Multiple Side Damage 
8.5.1 Structure susceptible to MSD/MED 
Susceptible structure is defined as that which has the potential to develop 
MSD/MED. Such structure typically has the characteristics of multiple similar details 
operating at similar stresses where structural capability could be affected by 
interaction of multiple cracking at a number of similar details. The following list 
contains known types of structure susceptible to MSD/MED. [25] 
Structural Areas:  
 Longitudinal Skin Joints, Frames, and Tear Straps (MSD/MED)         
 Circumferential Joints and Stringers (MSD/MED) 
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 Lap joints with Milled, Chem-milled or Bonded Radius (MSD) 
 Fuselage Frames (MED) 
 Stringer to Frame Attachments (MED) 
 Shear Clip End Fasteners on Shear Tied Fuselage Frames (MSD/MED)   
 Aft Pressure Dome Outer Ring and Dome Web Splices (MSD/MED) 
 Skin Splice at Aft Pressure Bulkhead (MSD) 
 Abrupt Changes in Web or Skin Thickness - Pressurized or Unpressurized 
Structure (MSD/MED) 
 Window Surround Structure (MSD, MED) 
 Over Wing Fuselage Attachments (MED) 
 Latches and Hinges of Non-plug Doors (MSD/MED) 
 Skin at Runout of Large Doubler (MSD) - Fuselage, Wing or Empennage 
 Wing or Empennage Chordwise Splices (MSD/MED) 
 Rib to Skin Attachments (MSD/MED) 
 Typical Wing and Empennage Construction (MSD/MED) 
Widespread fatigue damage (WFD), affecting large aging transport aircraft over 
75,000 pounds, is being addressed by FAA rulemaking. The WFD concern relates to 
a scenario where a series of small fatigue cracks, in the absence of highly-reliable 
small crack detection techniques, could lead to unacceptable reduction in residual 
strength below the damage tolerance safety requirements. The objectives of a WFD 
program are to identify the primary structures susceptible to WFD, to predict the 
time the WFD is expected to occur and to establish additional maintenance actions 
(inspections and modifications/replacements) as necessary to preclude WFD. The 
maintenance requirements that were developed and became mandatory have created 
an extensive, but not unbearable, workload for operators of large transport category 
aircraft. However, it was felt that compliance with these additional maintenance 
activities were needed to ensure the continual structural airworthiness of these 
aircraft as they aged; the efforts of the working groups that developed these 
additional programs have been vindicated. These additional maintenance 
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requirements were initially applicable only to 11 specific large transport category 
aircraft models. 
8.6 Structural Repair Assessments  
One of the ways is periodically updating the structural repair manuals (SRMs). 
Working through the repair assessment program, manufacturer task groups 
developed programs to address repairs that may affect the damage tolerance 
characteristics of the original airplane structure. For each model, structural repair 
manuals (SRM) assist the operator in ensuring that typical repair action maintains the 
airframe structural integrity. Repairs that are fallen out of SRM are handled by 
individually prepared and approved engineering drawings/sketches. These repairs 
have primarily focused on static strength and fail-safe aspects. If they are on primary 
structural elements, damage tolerance analysis would be required. 
8.6.1 Repair assessments guidelines (RAG) 
RAGs are airplane manufacturer’s model-specific guidelines on how to perform the 
repair assessment.  The fuselage is more sensitive to structural fatigue than other 
airplane structure because its normal operating stresses are closer to its limit design 
and more prone to damage from ground service equipment and corrosion than other 
structures and requires repair more often, therefore the repair assessment is currently 
limited to the external fuselage pressure boundary in figure 8.3. 
Uniformity/similarity of these repair assessment procedures is important to simplify 
operator workload.  
 
Figure 8.3: Fuselage Pressure Boundary Repairs 
The objective of these guidelines can be summarised as follows:  
 To provide a practical methodology in the form of guidance material to allow 
repairs to be evaluated by operators without complex analysis. 
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 To direct the repair evaluation process towards showing that an installed 
repair, which replaces the strength and durability of the original structure is 
found damage tolerant. 
 To develop a repair evaluation process such that it will identify when and 
what supplemental inspections (threshold, interval, method, location) are 
required. 
The SRMs and RAGs describes rationale for repair Categories A, B and C [1] as 
shown Figure 8.4. 
 
Figure 8.4: Repair Categorization 
Category A: A permanent repair for which the Base Zonal Inspection (BZI) is 
adequate to ensure continued airworthiness (inspectability) equal to the unrepaired 
surrounding structure. The operator should demonstrate to the regularity agency that 
its maintenance or inspection program is at least as rigorous as the BZI.  
Category B: A permanent repair that requires supplemental inspections to ensure 
continued airworthiness.  
Category C: A temporary repair that will need to be reworked or replaced before an 
established time limit. Supplemental inspections may be necessary to ensure 
continued airworthiness before this limit. 
There are two principal techniques that can be used to accomplish the repair 
assessment when using the manufacturer’s RAGs.  
The first technique involves a three-stage procedure. This technique could be well-
suited for operators of small fleets. The second technique involves the incorporation 
of the RAGs as part of an operator’s routine maintenance program.  
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This approach is well-suited for operators of large fleets and would evaluate repairs 
at predetermined, planned maintenance visits as part of the maintenance program. 
The first technique generally involves the execution of the following three stages 
[30] as shown figure 8.5. 
Stage 2: The repair categorization is determined by using the data gathered in Stage 1 
to answer simple questions regarding structural characteristics. Well-designed repairs 
in good condition meeting size and proximity requirements are Category A. The 
process continues for Category B and C repairs. 
 
Figure 8.5: Repair Assessment Stages 
Stage 3: The supplemental inspection and/or replacement requirements for Category 
B and C repairs are determined in this stage. Inspection requirements for the repair 
are determined by a simple calculation or by using manufacturer specific 
predetermined values incorporating the supplemental inspection requirements into 
the operators’ maintenance program completes the repair assessment process. 
 Stage 1Repair Identification 
& 
Data Collection 
 Stage 3
Determine Additional 
Inspection Requirements 
 Stage 2
Repair Categorization
 Repair Does not  Meet Minimum 
Requirements 
Category C Category B Category A 
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8.6.2. Continued airworthiness of structural repairs  
In the early 1990s, today the Airworthiness Assurance Task Force (AATF), now 
known as the Airworthiness Assurance Working Group (AAWG) was aimed/tasked 
with assessing the general condition of repairs on transport airplanes and developing 
recommendations concerning whether new or updated requirements and compliance 
methods for structural repair assessments of existing repairs should be instituted and 
made mandatory for several specific transport category airplanes. In 1996, a final 
report was released detailing the data they collected during two surveys of repairs 
done in 1992 and 1994 [31]: 
1992 Survey: A survey of lower fuselage repairs on stored airplanes was conducted 
at aircraft storage and salvage locations in Mojave, CA and Amarillo, TX. The work 
was conducted by teams of engineers from FAA Aircraft Certification Offices, FAA 
Flight Standards Offices, operators, and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
The teams surveyed 30 airplanes and assessed a total of 356 repairs. 
1994 Survey: A survey of repairs on in-service airplanes was conducted at various 
operators’ maintenance bases by only engineers from OEMs, which included Airbus, 
Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed. The teams surveyed 35 airplanes and assessed a 
total of 695 repairs. 
The scope of the studies was limited to an external visual observation of external 
lower fuselage plating repairs. The objectives were to gain first-hand observations of 
typical repairs, and to sample the numbers, types, proximities, and conditions of 
repairs. The quality of each repair was assessed based on AAWG repair criteria and 
with OEM size and proximity limits. Each repair was examined and classified into 
three categories [31]:  
Category A: A permanent repair for which the baseline zonal inspections are 
adequate to ensure continued airworthiness  (inspectability)  equivalent to unrepaired 
surrounding original structure.  
Category B: A permanent repair that requires supplemental inspections to ensure 
continued airworthiness.  
Category C: A temporary repair that will need to be reworked or replaced prior to an 
established time limit. Supplemental inspections may be necessary to ensure 
continued airworthiness prior to this limit. 
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Table 8.1 [31] shows a breakdown of the models and numbers surveyed in 1992 and 
1994. In all, a total of 65 airplanes (13:727, 9:737, 7:747, 3:DC-S, 10:DC-9, 4:DC-
10, 9:A300, 2:L-1011 8:F-28) and 1051 repairs were assessed. Average of 16 repairs 
per airline.  The study found that about 40% of repairs met the criteria for a Category 
A repair. The 60% that fell into Category B or C were primarily due to size and/or 
proximity criteria.  
The overall goal was to develop a qualitative opinion of repairs as a safety concern. 
In general, the AAWG concluded there was a need for repair assessment evaluations; 
although no immediate safety concern was observed. They cited a need for the 
following,  
(1) Updates to structural repair manuals and new guidance materials for repairs,  
(2) OEM developed repair assessment procedures for existing and new repairs, and 
(3) Repair assessments training’s necessity for operator and regulatory agencies  
In addition, the AAWG found the majority of repairs were on the fuselage pressure 
shell and older airplanes generally have more repairs. As a result of the work, the 
AAWG recommended certain regulatory changes that have led to implementation of 
the Repair Assessment Program [32,33]. 
 
There is a current project on the way. In comparison to the projects conducted in 
1992 and 1994,  the objective of the this new  project  is to determine the risk of 
Table 8.1: AAWG Fuselage Surveys Statistics
REPAIR CLASSIFICATION 
AIRPLANE 
MODEL 
AIRPLANES 
SURVEYED 
(92/94/TOTAL) 
REPAIRS 
REQUIRING NO 
ADDITIONAL 
ACTION 
(CATEGORY A) 
(92/94/TOTAL) 
REPAIRS REQUIRING 
SUPPlEMENTAL 
INSPECTIONS 
(CATEGORY B OR C) 
(92/94/TOTAL) 
 
TOTAL 
REPAIRS 
SURVEYED 
(92/94/TOTAL) 
727 6/7/13 39 /100/ 139 66/109/175 105 / 209/ 314 
737 5/4/9 41 /17 / 58 49/66 I 115 90 /83/173 
747 2/5/7 13 /37/ 50 32/130/162 45/ 167/ 212 
DC-8 0/3/0 0/56/56 0/43/43 0/99/99 
DC-9 6 /4/10 21 /37 / 58 32/16 /48 53 / 53 /106 
DC-10 0/4/4 0/12/12 0/ 21 /21 0/33 / 33 
A-300 9/0/9 17/0/17 18 I 0 118 35/0/35 
L-1011 2/0/2 12 1 0 I 12 16 I 0 I 16 28/0/28 
F-28 0/8/8 0/10/10 0/41/41 0/ 51 / 51 
TOTAL 30 I 35 165 143 1 269 1412 213/426 I 639 356 1695 I 1051 
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structural repairs, alterations, and modifications (RAM) RAMs developing WFD. 
While the objective of the current project is more specific, the net effect is similar in 
that the results will be used to support decisions on rulemaking activities. Because 
the AAWG work provided a benchmark for earlier rulemaking activities, the initial 
goal of the project was to survey at least as many RAMs identified as being surveyed 
in the 1996 report [31]. It was anticipated that the bulk of the RAMs would be 
repairs, and most of those would be found on fuselage skins, as it has been the 
structure of most concern in terms of WFD occurrence. While the fuselage pressure 
boundary was the primary concern, other structures including wing and empennage 
were considered [34]. 
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9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Aircrafts, like humans, deteriorate physically during their long lives. As the airplanes 
ages, operator’s workload increases. Accumulating stresses make it important to 
have regular checkups and, as the years go by, more frequent visits to specialists. 
Like geriatric medicine, aircraft aging science has become more proactive. 
Therefore, operators/airlines and Maintenance and Repair Organizations (MROs) 
should have qualified engineers on site, not only to detect and repair damage, but 
also to delay or even prevent the onset of certain problems. Also, by learning from 
the past, engineers can use the knowledge to recognize key factors, and potentially 
prevent another accident from occurring under similar circumstances, or for similar 
reasons, in the future.  
 
As discussed in this study, damage tolerance assessment and design play a major role 
in todays aerospace industry, not only in the design of new structures and 
components but also their ongoing maintenance and support. Composite material 
usage on aircraft is increasing rapidly, due to its light weight and fatigue resistance. 
To study on damage tolerance assessments of composite aircraft structures would be 
a challenging problem, because of lack of practical standards and educational 
materials of relevance to industry applications 
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Figure A.1: Types of Structure Suspectible to WFD  
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Figure A.1: (contd) Types of Structure Suspectible to WFD  
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Figure A.1: (contd) Types of Structure Suspectible to WFD  
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